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Abstract
The discussion on the right of the patient to "die with dignity" has been going on in the USA and Europe for
30 years. It focuses mostly on the following questions: 1. What is "death in dignity"?; 2. Is man entitled to
die in dignity, and if so, on what basis? 3. In what manner should we realise the right to die in dignity? The
concept of "death with dignity" is conditioned by anthropological assumptions and tends to be understood
as euthanasia or demise that maintains the personal and social integrity. The right to death is favoured by
the principle of autonomy, but it is contradicted by the inviolable nature of the right to life, which can
neither be renounced nor can anyone be deprived of it, even in the situation of a terminal disease.
The terminally ill and the dying do not cease to be humans; they still have their own personal dignity that
every man is entitled to, and the human rights that originate from it and protect them in their particular
situation. Therefore, such people have the right to be respected, to recognise their autonomy and to the
truth. The rights of a dying person guarantee that they are treated with dignity when they have a terminal
disease and that they can die with dignity. These rights demand that the dying are:
— treated as persons until death;
— provided with information concerning their health and part of the decision-making process;
enable them to refuse the therapies, which prolong the agony.
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Introduction
In 1972, the American Hospital Association edit-
ed the Declaration on Patients' Rights, which em-
phasises, among others, that the patient has a right
to reject a suggested therapy and to be informed
about its medical consequences [1]. The declaration
initiated a discussion in America, which brought up
a number of issues relating to patients' rights, in-
cluding “the right to die in dignity”. This discussion
has never officially ended. It is periodically revived
and includes more and more countries outside the
USA. The discussion has recently reached Poland,
where, similarly to other societies, we are looking
for the answers to the following questions:
— what is “death with dignity”?;
— is man entitled to die in dignity, and if so, on
what basis?;
— in what manner should we realise the right to
die in dignity?
Ways to understand “death
with dignity”
Dying is the last, integral stage of human life.
Perceiving the death of man as part of life explains
a lot, as it enables us to understand that death is
subject to the same principles as life. As a conse-
quence, the term “death with dignity” is strictly
related to the idea of “life in dignity”, as it expands
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this concept. The dignity of dying and living is root-
ed in our humanity. Therefore, the way in which we
understand it is conditioned by anthropological as-
sumptions.
“Good death” as euthanasia
The term “euthanasia” was used for the first
time around 300 BC in the comedy Myrmex by the
Greek author Poseidippos. He used the following
words: “Of all the things that man attempts to plead
from the Gods, he cannot ask for anything better
that a good death (euthanasia)” [2]. The term |”eu-
thanasia” was introduced to the modern language
by Francis Bacon in 1605. In his work “De dignitate
et augmentis scientiarum” (On dignity and the rise
of science), he introduced the expression “eutana-
sia exteriore — external euthanasia”, by which he
understood as, with medical assistance, a gentle
and pleasant departure from life if the disease does
not offer hope for recovery from the disease. Ac-
cording to his opinion, this type of euthanasia goes
beyond the principle of assisting the dying person,
and becomes a binding objective for doctors. The
opposite of “external euthanasia”, as Bacon puts it,
is another type of euthanasia, which consists in a
spiritual preparation to death [2].
Nowadays, the concept of euthanasia has be-
come much more ambiguous. It is usually under-
stood as a deliberate, direct, active or passive ac-
tion which that hastens the death of the sick, elder-
ly and retarded, as well as an assisted suicide. The
Encyclical Evangelium Vitae considers every “action
or omission which of itself and by intention causes
death with the purpose of eliminating all suffering”
to be per se and by definition euthanasia, and later
[3] reads that: “Euthanasia's terms of reference,
therefore, are to be found in the intention of the
will and in the methods used” [4]. This last remark
about the meaning of intention in euthanasia has
to be remembered, since, as it seems, only in some
cases does it become the only criterion, which en-
ables us to differentiate between passive euthana-
sia and futile therapy [5]. Each definition of eutha-
nasia contains the following elements:
— a person, whose death is hastened;
— another person, who participates in the hasten-
ing of death;
— the motivation to care for or the desire to relieve
the sick person from suffering.
The difference between active and passive eu-
thanasia does not alter those elements, but the
methods applied. There is, however, a very signifi-
cant difference between voluntary and non-volun-
tary euthanasia. In the case of voluntary euthana-
sia, we can at least assume the patient's autonomy
and his consent for such an act of murder, but the
other type is deprived of even those essential condi-
tions, required in all types of medical interventions
concerning human health and life [6]. Such actions
cannot, in any form, comply with the requirements
of human right, particularly the right to live.
The personalistic concept of “death with
dignity”
Personalistic orientated circles, which oppose the
legalization of euthanasia, emphasise, that “death
with dignity” means natural death, resulting from a
terminal disease or lack of biological ability of the
patient's organism to continue life due to ageing,
without applying artificial means to prolong life or
hasten death. Only such a death does not infringe
the fundamental right to live. Dying with dignity
also means retaining personal integrity as much as
possible, i.e. the fundamental features a person is
entitled to: consciousness and subjectivity, which in
this stage of life are translated into participation of
the patient in the therapeutic process. One of key
elements of dying with dignity is the possibility to
continue basic social roles and relations, thus main-
taining contact with relatives (family and friends),
which makes it possible for the patient expecting
death to stay at home, instead of in a hospice or
hospital. Last but not least, dying with dignity means
the lack of pain and other negative symptoms, which
may distress and distract the dying person, and
make their relations with the environment much
more complicated.
This interpretation of the right to die with digni-
ty was also supported by the Catholic Church in the
words: “The right to life is specified in the terminal-
ly ill person as a right to die in total serenity, with
human and Christian dignity. This cannot be inter-
preted as the power to kill oneself or to give this
power to others, but to experience dying in a hu-
man and Christian way and not flee from it at any
cost” [7]. Human dignity demands that “man is
able to end his life maintaining, as much as possi-
ble, the integrity of personality and relationships,
which connect them with the surrounding, particu-
larly the family” [8].
The right to death with dignity?
Since the concept of “death with dignity”, simi-
larly to the idea of “life with dignity” is conditioned
by accepted anthropological assumptions; therefore,
the right to death with dignity has various interpre-
tations. The utilitarian circles and those that prefer
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relativistic ethics interpret the right to death with
dignity as the right of the patient to euthanasia.
According to those circles, the basis for such a right
is the autonomy of man, which enables them to
make decisions about themselves, including their
life. Supporters of personalistic ethics and the prin-
ciple of human dignity protected by human rights
believe that the consent to euthanasia of terminally
ill patients in the name of their autonomy is to be
regarded as abuse. There are no sufficient grounds
to agree that patients may only renounce their right
to life in the situation of a terminal disease, in the
name of patients' autonomy, and not to expand
this principle to include all people in all kinds of
situations [6]. “If we truly believe in self-determina-
tion, then a competent person should have the right
to be killed by a doctor for any reason they may see
fit. If we believe in the freedom from suffering, then
refusing them such competence seems cruel and
fickle” [9]. Consequently, either the principle of au-
tonomy, which authorises the renouncement to the
right to life, should be expanded to include all cas-
es, or it should not exist at all. Limiting this princi-
ple solely to the terminally ill leads to its instrumen-
talisation. People not only have right, but also the
obligation, to retain their own rights and respect
the rights of other people in all situations, not con-
fined to those which favour us or others. Human
rights and the obligation to respect them cannot be
separated [10]. If we do not consider the right to
life as inviolable, which means that it cannot be
renounced nor can anyone be deprived of it, then
there are no grounds to make an exception in the
situation of a terminal disease.
Basic rights of dying persons
The discussions concerning dying with dignity
include many references to religious, ethical and
social arguments, which speak against the legalisa-
tion of euthanasia and in favour of the consent to
abandon overzealous therapy. However, it seems
that only to a little extent do the opponents of
euthanasia make reference to the most universal
moral criterion of the modern world, which is the
human right based on the conviction formulated in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 1):
”All human beings are born free and equal in digni-
ty and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a
spirit of brotherhood”. The dignity of man and the
rights that originate from it are the only universal
and commonly accepted moral principle in the mod-
ern and pluralistic world, accepted by people of all
worldviews, including the Catholic Church. The Cath-
olic interpretation of human rights and its substan-
tiation has been presented in its entirety in the en-
cyclical Pacem in terris, by Pope John XXIII. He wrote,
among others, that “any well-regulated and pro-
ductive association of men in society demands the
acceptance of one fundamental principle: that each
individual man is truly a person. His is of a nature
that is endowed with intelligence and free will. As
such, he has rights and duties, which together flow
as a direct consequence from his nature” [11]. It is
not without its significance, that the united Europe
has perceived human rights as the fundamental ele-
ments of European identity for over thirty years [12].
Human rights result from the structure of this
identity, thus their number is limited. The basis for
human rights to be binding and inviolable is human
dignity, understood as a specific value and emi-
nence of each representative of the Homo sapiens
species, conditioned by the uniqueness of man,
which sets them apart among all creatures living on
Earth. It is universally accepted that there are three
generations of human rights, which were gradually
brought to attention of societies: political and civil
rights which protect each person against the dicta-
torship of the individual, and the democratic major-
ity (freedom rights); economic and social rights,
which protect against the discrimination on unequal
treatment, and solidarity rights which guarantee
equal access to development [13]. We can also talk
about existential human rights, that is the applica-
tion and specification of the rights included in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to a specific
existential situation, which demands special pro-
tection. We can, therefore, refer to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Charter of the Rights of
the Family, Charter of Patient's Rights and Charter
of the Right of Dying Person.
The terminally ill and the dying do not cease to
be human; they still have their own personal digni-
ty that every man is entitled to, and the human
rights that originate from it and protect them in
their particular situation. Therefore, such people have
the right to be respected, their autonomy to be
recognised and to the truth. In this context, the
rights of the dying appear to be the rights which
guarantee human dignity until death [14].
The right to receive proper treatment
until death
The process of ageing can be divided into three
aspects: biological (impairment and loss of cell and
tissue functions), psychical (reduction and loss of
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psychical functions), and social (gradual withdraw-
al from social roles). The tempo and way of ageing
are conditioned endogenously (the genetic code)
and they also depend on the lifestyle and psychical
attitude of a particular person, in the periods which
precede ageing and during the process of ageing.
Human and natural environment, in which people
live, also have their effect. The development of Per-
sonalism in the 20th century made us aware that the
reductionism, which confines humanity only to bio-
logical functions, it to be avoided. A person is to be
seen as a spiritual and bodily composition that has
a personal status and the right to live, regardless of
the quality of its vital functions. The subject of the
right to life is “the human being (…), in every phase
of development, from conception until natural
death; and in every condition, whether healthy or
sick, whole or handicapped, rich or poor” [15].
In our times of relativism, there is a growing
tendency to grant the right of life only to those
human beings, who are endowed with a sufficient-
ly high quality of life and function on a proper indi-
vidual and social level. In relation to human rights,
and particularly the right to life, two fundamental
principles apply: no one can arbitrarily grant or refuse
human rights to any human being; they also cannot
be refused such rights on the account of having or
not having certain features. Who would therefore
have the right to define the quality of life in the
terminally ill and classify them into those who still
have and who have lost the right to life?
Peter Singer, an Australian ethicist, is a well-
known opponent of unconditional granting the right
to life to every human being. He makes a difference
between a human being, and a person. According
to his view, a person is a living being, empowered
with the following four features:
— it is a conscious and autonomous being;
— it has a will to last and enjoys certain experienc-
es;
— it has the ability to make physical, social and
intellectual contacts with other beings;
— it has relatives, who would mourn after his or
her death [16].
This definition enables Singer to recognise a foe-
tus, a newborn human child and a person with de-
mentia as members of the human species, but he
refuses them a personal status. This perspective leads
him, as a consequence, to the conviction that a
terminally ill person, deprived of autonomy and con-
sciousness, deserves only euthanasia. Because of the
fact that Mr Singer has found many supporters, it is
very important for the terminally ill and the dying
to guarantee them the right to personal status until
death.
The right to information concerning
One’s own health and participation
in the decision-making
Modern medical ethics and medical laws high-
light the right of the patient to be informed about
their health condition. With this right in mind, we
cannot forget that the process of conveying infor-
mation must be performed in a kindly manner. The
manner in which the information is conveyed to
the patient is of crucial importance. The Anglo-
Saxon tradition stresses the autonomy of every
human being and the right of a patient to be in-
formed about the whole truth, regardless of the
prognosis. The European tradition requires taking
into account the situation of the patient. Accord-
ing to the binding Medical Code of Ethics, “a doc-
tor may refrain from informing the patient about
this health condition or treatment, if the patient
expresses such will” (art. 16). “In the event of an
unfavourable prognosis, the doctor should inform
the patient with tact and caution. The patient may
not be informed about diagnosis and unfavour-
able prognosis only in the event that the doctor is
deeply convinced that revealing such information
would inflict great suffering upon the patient, or
bring other negative results to health. However,
he is obliged to convey the full information upon
an explicit request of the patient” (art. 17). The
Anglo-Saxon and European way of conveying in-
formation to the patient is sometimes supplement-
ed with a third form, which consists in doctors
assisting patients in a gradual revealing of the truth
about their condition by themselves.
While every patient has the right to be informed
about their health condition, then, consequently,
all people suffering from incurable diseases are en-
titled to this right as well. The approaching death is
a too significantly personal event to keep it secret
from the sick person. A dying person has not only
rights, but also obligations. “For every person the
proximity of death bears a responsibility to fulfil
certain duties, relating to the relationship with their
family, sorting out all potential professional affairs,
updating the accounts and debts, etc.” [8].
Apart from the existing difficulties connected
with communication with the terminally ill, they
cannot be refused the right to be informed about
their condition. There are numerous reasons to sup-
port this point of view:
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— respect for another human being demands to
deliver to him or her data, which would make
him or her aware of their health condition;
— sooner or later, the patient will learn the truth,
but they will be alone with it, deprived of pro-
fessional help;
— cooperation of the patient in the terminal stage
of the disease is of crucial importance, and a
well-informed patient may become more moti-
vated;
— patients should have the opportunity to organ-
ise their family, legal and religious matters;
— patients will feel safer, if they can be open to-
wards the environment in this difficult time of
dying;
— concealing the truth reduces the authority and
confidence towards the doctor and his associ-
ates [17].
“The perspective of death complicates and dra-
matises the conveying of information, but it does
not absolve one from the responsibility of convey-
ing it. The communication between the dying and
those who assist them must not be based on pre-
tending. The dying do not deserve such a demeanour
and it does not contribute to the humanisation of
death” [7].
The patient also requires comprehensive infor-
mation about their condition, so that they can par-
ticipate in the decision-making concerning the ap-
plied therapy. Medical laws, codes and declaration
concerning medical ethics demand this principle to
be observed. According to the so-called European
Bioethical Convention, every medical intervention
must be based on the consent of the person inter-
ested. “An intervention in the health field may only
be carried out after the person concerned has given
free and informed consent to it. This person shall
beforehand be given appropriate information as to
the purpose and nature of the intervention as well
as on its consequences and risks. The person con-
cerned may freely withdraw consent at any time”
[18].
The realisation of the patient's right to be in-
formed about their condition, and the right to be
part of the decision-making about applied thera-
pies, has significant consequences in the terminal
disease as well. Therefore, if the terminally ill pa-
tients have not yet settled their affairs, one can
refrain from analgesia leading to restricting con-
sciousness of the patient, so as to give them time to
fulfil their obligations. However, if the patient re-
fuses to do that and insists on taking painkillers,
the doctor is obliged to satisfy that will. Such con-
duct is substantiated by the conviction that fulfill-
ing those obligations by the patient is left solely to
his discretion. Even the patients with full mental
capacity may refuse to satisfy the obligations that
rest with them.
The right to refuse a therapy that
prolongs the process of dying
Modern medicine has the unique means of heal-
ing and prolonging human life. Such therapies con-
sume vast amounts of financial assets, and they are
often connected with uncomfortable medical inter-
ventions, which do not bring the expected improve-
ment of patients' condition. This is the reason for
bringing up a significant issue of how long the pa-
tient, their family and society are obliged to take
such therapies. It is difficult to determine the scope
of obligations for the patient, doctor or relatives, in
each separate case of any disease. In order to facili-
tate such decision, the concept of ordinary and ex-
traordinary medical means was developed in the
past.
Ordinary means of treatment are such means
which:
— is financially accessible to the majority of people
living in a given country;
— does not induce excessive and prolonged suffer-
ing of the patient;
— has the potential of recovery.
The extraordinary means are those which:
— are very expensive, i.e. are beyond the financial
capability of the patient, family and the regular
services of the social health care;
— may result in severe and negative organic or psy-
chical effects (e.g. brain surgery may lead to per-
manent disorders of psychical functions);
— offers little hope for recovery. The use of the
latter is left to the patient's sole discretion. How-
ever, nobody is morally obliged to use them [19].
Today, we tend to talk about proportionate and
disproportionate medical measures, which should
be implemented to restore health and save life, or
abandoned.  This difference is conditioned by spe-
cific cases, and the criteria for such differentiation
are both objective and subjective.  Objective criteria
include: the nature of applied measures, their fi-
nancial cost and the consequences resulting from
the principle of justice. Subjective criteria include:
the necessity to avoid anxiety and dread, distress,
discomfort, and the psychological shock related to
the implementation of those measures. The funda-
mental criterion of differentiation is the proportion
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between means and purpose that one wants to
achieve with the means implemented.
Discontinuing medical procedures that are bur-
densome, dangerous, extraordinary, or disproportion-
ate to the expected outcome can be legitimate. This
the refusal of the so-called “overzealous therapy”,
which consists in the use of extraordinary medical
procedures (technical appliances and pharmacologi-
cal means), in order to artificially sustain vital func-
tions of the patient suffering from a terminal disease
and delay the moment of death. Overzealous thera-
py is medically ineffective, prolongs agony in a limit-
ed way (sometimes up to a few months), and results
in extremely high financial costs and disproportion-
ate personal costs (suffering and limited function-
ing) for the patient and/or their family. Overzealous
therapy does not include basic nursing services (feed-
ing and hydrating, alleviating pain and other symp-
toms). The decision to abandon overzealous therapy
is made by free and well-informed patients them-
selves, after having been acquainted with a medical-
ly substantiated opinion of a competent doctor, and
according to his knowledge and conscience.
The concept of overzealous therapy and the pos-
sibility to abandon it is found in the documents of
the Catholic Church. In the situation when “when
death is clearly imminent and inevitable, one can in
conscience refuse forms of treatment that would
only secure a precarious and burdensome prolon-
gation of life, so long as the normal care due to the
sick person in similar cases is not interrupted. (...)
To forego extraordinary or disproportionate means
is not the equivalent of suicide or euthanasia; it
rather expresses acceptance of the human condi-
tion in the face of death” [4]. The decisions should
be made by the patient if he is competent and able
or, if not, by those legally entitled to act for the
patient, whose reasonable will and legitimate inter-
ests must always be respected [20]. In this context,
let us refer to the letter of Cardinal Villot to the
International Federation of Catholic Medical Associ-
ations: “It must be emphasised that it is the sacred
character of life which forbids a physician to kill and
makes it a duty for him at the same time to use
every resource of his art to fight against death. This
does not, however, mean that a physician is under
any obligation to use all and every one of the life-
maintaining techniques offered to him by the inde-
fatigable creativity of science. Would it not be a
useless torture, in many cases, to impose vegetative
reanimation during the last phase of an incurable
disease?” [8].
Although the concept of overzealous therapy and
the possibility of abandoning it have been univer-
sally accepted in the medical ethics of today, these
issues still remain controversial and many questions
relating to overzealous therapy has not found clear
answers [21]. Those questions include: Does aban-
doning overzealous therapy mean refraining from
it, or withdrawing from the therapy already imple-
mented as well? Can a doctor refrain from overzeal-
ous therapy against the will of the patient? What
does it mean to “refrain from overzealous therapy”
in terminally ill patients suffering from heart, renal
or lung failure? Let us hope that these questions
will be answered in the future.
Conditions of abandoning overzealous
therapy
The definition of overzealous therapy, worked
out by the participants of the II Expert Seminar, as
part of the project Boundaries of medical therapies,
that took place on 29th June 2008, is the following:
“Overzealous therapy is the application of medical
procedures with the goal of supporting vital func-
tions in a terminally ill person that results in pro-
longed dying, and is associated with excessive suf-
fering and/or with violation of the patient's dignity.
Overzealous therapy does not include basic nurs-
ing, control of pain and of other symptoms or feed-
ing and fluid administration, as long as these ac-
tions are beneficial to the dying person” [22].
Abandoning futile therapy requires respecting
the following principles:
1. Human life is treated as a value not conditioned
by health condition, quality of this life, autono-
my of the patient and their ability to think and
express their will.
2. The difference between a life worthy and un-
worthy of its continuation is arbitrary, since the
dignity of the human being is not conditioned
by the biological status of the organism.
3. Abandoning overzealous therapy may consist
in refusing to implement it or withdrawing from
the procedures already implemented.
4. The only justification of abandoning overzeal-
ous therapy is providing the dying person with
a natural death with dignity, and not providing
savings in the health care system.
5. The goal of abandoning overzealous therapy is
not the shortening the life of a patient, but not
prolonging the agony and delaying what is in-
evitable.
6. The extraordinary and ineffective character of
medical means is objective, conditioned by the
current level of medicine development and the
economic situation of a country.
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7. Disproportionate personal costs of overzealous
therapy are conditioned by the personality of
the patient, their sensitivity and resistance to
pain and suffering.
8. Abandoning overzealous therapy is an autono-
mous decision of the patient, who is well in-
formed about their condition and impending
death.
9. If the patient is unable to express their will per-
sonally, the family may convey such informa-
tion to the doctor, according to previously ex-
pressed attitude of the patient.
10. A doctor's decision to refrain from implement-
ing or abandon overzealous therapy may be tak-
en after the patient has reached a critical state,
predicted in the scenario of death for a given
type of disease.
11. A doctor's decision to refrain from implement-
ing or abandon overzealous therapy should be
in accordance with the binding legal system.
12. The will of the patient, expressed in the “Living
Will”, informs the doctor about their wish. The
doctor makes a decision, according to his or her
knowledge and conscience.
13. Hydrating and feeding is considered to be a
basic nursing service. Abandoning such services
may be caused only by the objective well-being
of the patient, when their continuation has the
hallmark of therapeutic persistency.
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